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Abstract
The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a Pay-for-Performance scheme introduced in England in 2004 to
reward primary care providers. This incentive scheme provides financial incentives that reward the overall
performance of a practice, not individual effort. Consequently, an important question is how the QOF may affect
contractual choices, quality provision and doctor mobility in the primary healthcare labour market. The paper
provides a simple theoretical model that shows that the introduction and further strengthening of the scheme may
have induced practices to compete for the best doctors and modified their choices in terms of contractual
agreements with practitioners. We test the implications of this model using a linkage between Doctors Census data
and practices’ characteristics from 2003 to 2007. We use linear multilevel models with random intercept and we
account for sample selection. We find that after the introduction of the QOF efficient doctors are more likely to
become partners and mobility among doctors has increased. The strengthening of the scheme in 2005 is associated
with an increase in the quality of primary care and a reduction in access to the market for new doctors.
Keywords: P4P, contracts, Primary care, Mobility
JEL Classification: I11, I18, J41
Introduction
The number of GPs in the U.K. has risen by an aver-
age of 1.8% each year between 2004 and 2014, but there
are still problems in recruiting and retaining GPs into the
healthcare market (The Health Foundation [16]). In the
U.K. there is also a relative long tradition in the use of
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes, but little is known
about the sorting and retention effects theymight produce
(Lazear [9]).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the sorting and
retention effects of the only P4P scheme for General Prac-
titioners (GPs) in the U.K., the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF). GPs are paid under a mix of capi-
tation and financial incentives including the QOF. The
QOF awards an amount ofmoney to practices that achieve
certain levels of performance. Such pay is linked to the
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performance of the practice and may then be internally
distributed over to GPs. We examine the effects that
the introduction of the QOF in 2004 and its subsequent
strengthening in 2005 had on the contractual arrange-
ments, the provision of quality and doctor mobility in the
primary healthcare market.
We motivate our empirical analysis with a simple theo-
retical model with two practices combining three aspects
of the primary healthcare sector that together, to our
knowledge, have not yet been considered by the litera-
ture. These are: i) the altruistic1 nature of the GP’s job; ii)
different contractual arrangements (e.g. salaried positions
or partnerships) for GPs (National Audit Office [11]); and
iii) the multidimensional nature of quality experienced by
patients as a mix of the effort of GPs, front desk and
nursing staff. In our model each practice serves a rep-
resentative patient and requires the effort of one doctor
to provide healthcare. Doctors may be of two types: effi-
cient and inefficient. If they are efficient, then they are
able to provide medical effort at a lower cost than the
other type of doctors, the inefficient ones. The model
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Fichera and Pezzino Health Economics Review  (2017) 7:6 Page 2 of 14
predicts that the behaviour of a salaried doctor will not
be affected by the introduction of the P4P scheme, since
her remuneration is not quality-dependent. However, the
introduction of the QOFmay induce practices to compete
(offering partnerships) for the best doctors and increase
mobility.
We test the empirical implications of this model using
a unique linkage between GP Census data from 2003
to 2007 with practices’ characteristics in England. We
then link these data with information on practices’ per-
formance on the QOF. Whilst we find that the intro-
duction of the QOF in 2004 decreased the probability
of becoming a partner by one percentage point, more
efficient doctors are more likely to be partners. Mobil-
ity of doctors increased by two percentage points after
the QOF was introduced. But more efficient doctors are
less likely to move. And doctors in better practices are
also less likely to move. Overall, these results might sug-
gest some evidence of a sorting effect of the QOF with
more efficient doctors becoming partners and retention
of doctors in higher quality practices. Finally, we find
that the strengthening of the scheme in 2005 has pro-
duced on average an increase in primary care quality
of practices. Over the period between 2004 and 2007
more efficient doctors improve the quality of the practice
and if they are also partners they put more effort. How-
ever, we observe a decrease in GPs’ effort connected to
the strengthening of the scheme. We interpret this result
with the existence of reputational effects as described




Incentive pay is a way to partially overcome information
asymmetries in the labour market. The rationale behind
P4P is to tie workers’ compensation to their output align-
ing their individual objectives to those of the firm (see for
example, Lazear [9]; Prendergast [13]; Ross [15]). If such
schemes are introduced in multi-level organisations, there
might be two potentially counteracting effects at play. On
the one hand, individual agents might free-ride on the
team thus weakening the incentive effect of P4P. On the
other hand, the sorting effect might causemore able work-
ers to select and stay in performance pay jobs and less able
workers to leave these jobs (see for example, Dohmen and
Falk [4]; Gielen et al. [6]; Lazear [10]; 2000). According to
these studies, in equilibrium workers relocate themselves
on the basis of their ability, thus increasing productivity
and wages in firms that use P4P schemes.
In this paper we focus on the QOF, an incentive scheme
that applied to practices, which has increased doctors’
income by 25 percent (NHS Review Body [12]). We
examine its effects on doctors’ behaviour (e.g. mobility
and effort provision) and on practices’ behaviour (e.g.
contractual arrangements). This is an important issue for
the incentive and sorting effects in the GPs’ labour market
and for the resulting potential inequalities in the provision
of healthcare to patients.
The Quality and Outcomes Framework
In the U.K. most healthcare is delivered by the National
Health Service (NHS), which is a comprehensive freely
available service funded out of general taxation. All citi-
zens are registered with a GP who delivers primary care
and acts as gatekeeper for elective secondary care. Pri-
mary care practices are typically a group of one to six
doctors responsible for a pool of patients. They are inde-
pendent contractors retaining the surpluses they make as
private income.
In early 2000s the terms of two new contracts for GPs
remuneration were negotiated (see the National Audit
Office [11]). The first contract is the nationally nego-
tiated General Medical Services (GMS), with a mix of
capitation, lump sum allowances and P4P schemes, such
as the QOF. The capitation payment is based on the
number of patients treated by a practice, adjusted for
the characteristics of both patients and area where the
practice operates. The second contract is the Primary
Medical Services (PMS), negotiated between the prac-
tice and the local primary care organisation. Under the
PMS contract, the practice receives a lump sum pay-
ment for the same services provided in the GMS con-
tract (Gravelle et al., [8]). The first three years of this
new contract cost about £1.76 billion (National Audit
Office [11]).
The new GMS contract was officially introduced on
1st April 2004 with measurement of achievements on 1st
April 2005 for the previous 12 months (Roland [14]). In
the first two years of the QOF, practices were rewarded
on the basis of performance points reported on 146 indi-
cators. The points correspond to an amount of money
in pounds sterling (£) claimed annually. Points were
awarded on the basis of reported coverage rates above
a lower threshold of 40% and an upper threshold that
varied depending on the particular indicator (see Doran
et al., [5]). The average price per point in 2004 was £76,
increasing to £125 in 2005. Thresholds of payments for
some indicators increased between 2005 and 2006 so that
it wasmore difficult for a practice to be rewarded the same




Let us consider a market where patients are treated by
two practices, say practice 1 and 2, located at a positive
distance t > 0 from each other. Practices need only one
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doctor to serve their population. Let us suppose that there
are two types of doctors: efficient (v) and inefficient (nv).
The mass of doctors of type v is equal to π ∈ [0, 1], and
consequently the mass of doctors of type nv is equal to
(1 − π ).
Suppose that the practices know the type of two
doctors, each located next to a practice. These doc-
tors’ type may be known because they were previously
employed.
Practices can however access the labour market and
offer a salary to new doctors (whose type will be ex-
ante unknown) who receive salary wi from practice
i, i = 1, 2. The utility of the salaried doctor z =
{v, nv}, who works for practice i, is (superscript N indi-
cates that we are considering the case of new salaried
doctors):
UNzi = wi + Qzi − γz
e2zi
2 + bi (1)
where Qzi is the total level of quality of care of practice i;
γz
e2zi
2 is the doctor’s cost of effort2, with 1 = γnv ≥ γv > 0
representing the degree of inefficiency of doctor z; ei is the
level of effort invested by the doctor employed by practice
i and bi ≥ 0 is the benefit the doctor receives from access-
ing the amenities in the neighbourhood of practice i. Let
us assume that the outside option of a new salaried doctor
is equal to zero.
Notice the utility in (1) increases with the quality of
care Qzi; this captures the assumption that doctors are
assumed to be altruistic and care about quality. The qual-
ity perceived by patients is the sum of quality improve-
ments given by doctor’s effort and practice’s investment in
facilities and nursing staff:
Qzi = qi + ezi (2)
where qi is the quality investment of the practice (e.g.
nursing staff, front desk, IT).
Practices are run by doctors who have taken a
completely profit-oriented managerial position in the
practice.
If a practice employs a new doctor its (expected) profit
function is given by:
Ni = m + p [πQvi + (1 − π)Qnvi] − wi −
q2i
2 (3)
where m is a capitation payment, p ≥ 0 is the quality-
related payment based on a P4P scheme, q
2
i
2 is the cost
function of the practice3.
The timing unravels as follows.
In stage 1, practices (i.e. managers) choose the contract
to offer to the doctor; specifically they may offer a part-
nership to one of the doctors whose type is known or a
salaried contract to a new doctor.
In stage 2, practices choose investment in quality qi
to maximise profits. Doctors who accepted a contract
choose the level of effort ezi to maximise utility.
In stage 3, primary health care is provided.
Salaried contract
Let us look first at the provision of care when a practice
hires a new doctor.
The effort chosen by the salaried doctor in stage two is
simply produced by the satisfaction of first order condi-
tions to maximise (1).
dUNi
dezi




Notice that p has no effect on the effort choice of the
salaried doctor. This is not surprising, since she receives
a remuneration that does not depend on the quality of
care.
Similarly the maximisation of profits defines the invest-
ment in quality of the practices at stage two.
dNi
dqi
= 0 ⇒ qNi = p (5)
Since the outside option of a new doctor is equal to zero
and the resulting utility is strictly positive, practices will
set wi = 0.4 Notice that a positive p is necessary to induce
the practice to invest in quality. In equilibrium:
Ni = N = m +
p
2
2 + p(γv + π − γvπ)
γv
(6)
Notice also that, when the practices choose to hire a new
doctor, profits increase inm, p, and π , and decrease in γv.
In addition, if p = 0 (i.e. no P4P scheme is in place), then
Ni = m.
Partnership contracts and competition over doctors
Subsection Salaried contract considered the case in which
practices decided to hire a new doctor in stage one. How-
ever next to each practice lives a doctor whose type
is known and who could be offered a partnership. A
practice may be also willing to pay a relocation pack-
age equal to t and offer a partnership to the doctor
located next to the other practice. Similar to the analysis
in section Salaried contract, let us study first the pro-
vision of care of a practice who employs a partner of
type z.
Assuming that a partner will be entitled, in addition to
a salary, to equally share profits with the management,5
the utility of a partner and the remaining profits for the
practice are equal to:




















Superscripts P and M indicate variables respectively
related to a doctor working as a partner and a manager in
a partnership.













Comparing (7) with (4) it is clear that ePzi ≥ eNzi (this is
the effect of the incentive of the P4P scheme). Not sur-
prisingly, the practice investment is not directly affected
by the partnership and qMzi = qNi . In addition, without
the P4P scheme, i.e. p = 0, practice quality would be
qNzi = qMzi = 0.
The study of the expressions in (4), (5) and (7) produces
a testable implication: an increase in the QOF price per-
quality-point (i.e. higher p) may increase medical effort
and practice quality.
The utility of the partner in equilibrium is given by
UPzi = bi +
(p + 2)2
8γz
+ (2m + p
2 + 2wPi + 4p)
4
UPzi > 0. Let us suppose again that the outside option
of the doctor is sufficiently low to allow practices to offer
wPi = 0. Remaining equilibrium profits for the manager
are given by
Mzi =
γz(2m + p2) + p(p + 2)
4γz
An increase in p (P4P incentive) has a positive effect on
quality (both QPzi and ePzi), partner’s utility and practice’s
profits. Notice that if p = 0 (i.e. no P4P scheme is in place)
then Mzi = m2 < N = m. In other words, without a P4P
scheme, it is not desirable for a profit-oriented practice to
offer a partnership. This implies that with the introduc-
tion of P4P incentives practices become more concerned
about the ability of the doctors. Consequently, they will
consider offering partnerships and eventually compete to
attract the best doctors.
This provides another testable implication: the introduc-
tion of the QOF (p > 0 compared to p = 0) may have
created mobility among doctors.
In stage one a practice needs to choose whether to offer
a partnership to (either) of the two old doctors or access
the labor market.
Three scenarios may exist: (i) both old doctors are of
type v, (ii) both old doctors are of type nv, (iii) the old
doctor in practice 1 is of type v, while the old doc-
tor in practice 2 is of type nv.6 Due to the existence
of relocation costs t, in cases (i) and (ii) the practices
will not find profitable to offer a partnership to the
doctors located in another region. There is not com-
petition for doctors is case (i) and (ii) and, therefore,
we discard these scenarios. Relocation will be feasible
instead in case (iii) and this will be the focus of our
analysis.
In any case, in stage one a practice will consider to offer





The necessary condition is satisfied in the subset of the
parameters S, where:










∣∣0≤m<m¯, p>0,0<γz<1, 0<π < 1−2γz2 (1−γz)
]
m¯ = p(p − γzp + 2(1 + 2γz(−1 + π) − 2π))2γz
and p¯ = 2(2π − 1 − 2γz(1 − π))1 − γz
It follows that a practice will offer a partnership only
if the probability to hire an efficient new doctor is low
or if the P4P incentive is sufficiently strong to enhance
the performance for the doctor and, consequently, prof-
its. Notice that γnv = 1 does not belong to sets S1
nor S2. This means that Mnvi < N . In other words,
no practice will offer a partnership to an inefficient
doctor.
This provides another testable implication: efficient doc-
tors are more likely to be offered a partnership.
Focusing our attention on parameters in S, simple




shows that an increase in π (the probability to hire an effi-
cient new doctor), in γv (i.e. less efficient to provide effort
for type v doctors) or in the capitation payment m reduce
the profitability of offering a partnership andmay increase
turn-over. An increase in p, instead, induces a practice
to offer a partnership to the local efficient doctor. This
last result implies that an increase in p reduces access to
the job market to new (salaried) doctors, another testable
implication.
Let us focus our attention to the case in which an
asymmetric allocation of doctors may induce practices to
compete for the best doctors. Let us assume for example
that an efficient doctor is located next to practice 1 and an
inefficient one is located next to practice 2.
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Let us restrict our attention to the following subset of
parameters:
Sˆ ≡ S ∩ [ t| 0 < t < Mvi − Mnvi]
Set Sˆ ensures that relocation costs are sufficiently small
to make relocation of an efficient doctor feasible.
Practice 1may face competition from practice 2 over the
services of the efficient doctor and therefore may have to
offer a higher salary in order to outbid the rival. Define
˜Mv1 the profits earned by practice 1 hiring the efficient
doctor when practice 2 is also offering a partnership to the








s.t.UPv1 (w1) ≥ UPv2 (w2)
Constraint UPv1 (w1) ≥ UPv2 (w2) requires that the effi-
cient doctor will not be worse off accepting a partnership
by practice 1 rather than practice 2. Using expressions (7),
the condition simplifies to
w1 ≥ w2 − 2(b1 − b2) (8)
The highest salary that practice 2 will be willing to offer
to the vocational doctor is
w¯2 : maxMv2 − t = maxN (9)
It follows that w¯2 = p2−γv(2m+p2+4t)+2p(1+2γv(−1+π)−2π)2γv
≥ 0 for parameters in Sˆ.
The salary that practice 1 has to guarantee to the local
efficient doctor to beat competition from practice 2 is




Simple comparative statics analysis shows that dw¯1dp > 0
(an increase in p increases the performance of the part-
ner and, therefore, the willingness to pay of practice 2)
and dw¯1db2 > 0 (if the neighbourhood of practice 2 provides
attractive amenities, practice 1 needs to reward the effi-




dπ < 0 (increases in m, γv and π make less
desirable for practice 2 the option of hiring a new doctor
and, consequently, practice 1 can reduce the salary offered
to the efficient doctor7); dw¯1dt < 0,
dw¯1
db1 < 0 (an increase
in t or b1 makes more difficult for practice 2 to attract the
efficient doctor).
The profits obtained by practice 1 when offering the
partnership to the local efficient doctor are:
˜Mv1 = b1 − b2 +m+ t +
p
2




˜Mv1 − N = b1 − b2 + t (11)
Mobility (in our example the relocation of the efficient
doctor from practice 1 to practice 2) ultimately depends
on the relocation costs and the characteristics of the areas
where the two practices operate. Indeed mobility will
increase if the relocation costs or the workplace qual-
ity differential (b1 − b2) decrease. The P4P scheme does
not directly affect the willingness to pay of practice 1 to
retain the efficient doctor. Since the scheme offers the
same incentives to both practices, an increase in p equally
induces both practices to compete for the efficient doctor.
The scheme, however, may have an effect on the wel-
fare of the efficient doctor. In fact, the efficient doctor
may be better off because of the competition from prac-
tice 2. The increase in utility (compared to a partnership
in practice 1 without competition) depends on ultimately
in w¯1.
Empirical strategy
The above-described theoretical model motivates our
empirical strategy by providing the following testable
implications:
1. Efficient doctors are more likely to be offered a
partnership.
2. The introduction of the QOF (p > 0 compared to
p = 0) may have created mobility among doctors.
3. An increase in the QOF price per-quality-point (i.e.
higher p) may have (i) increased medical effort and
practice quality, (ii) decreased access to the job
market to new (salaried) doctors to replace
inefficient colleagues.
As a result, the empirical strategy focuses on how to
model efficiency, partnership, mobility and access of new
doctors to the healthcare market. Efficiency can be mod-
elled as a function of an observed component, e.g. expe-
rience, and an unobserved one, e.g. ability. Ideally, we
would need a single data source with a large longitudinal
sample where we have sufficient doctors’ mobility and we
measure wage as proxy for efficiency. Since such source
of data is not available, we have to use age as proxy for
efficiency in the General Medical Services (GMS) Statis-
tics Databases. In reality there are complex interactions
between experience and efficiency so it is not an unrea-
sonable assumption. We can test whether age is positively
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correlated with practices’ quality on a sample of single-
handed practices in order to attribute efficiency to a single
doctor rather than to the average doctor in a practice. We
estimate three separate pooled linear regression models.
These models can be formally described as follows:
yijt = a + bxij(t−1) + dwij(t−1) + gzj(t−1) + ijt (12)
where y indicates the proportion of total QOF points
practice j achieves. The subscript i = 1, . . . ,N indicates
each of the N doctors, j = 1, . . . ,N indicates each prac-
tice and t = 2004, 2005. Demographic characteristics of
doctor i, including age, are denoted by xij(t−1), wij(t−1) is
doctor’s i income in practice j and zj(t−1) are practice j
characteristics. ijt indicates the residual of equation (12).
We then test the implications of the theoretical model
using pooled linear probability models and random inter-
cept multilevel models8, accounting for sample selection
bias in the mobility equation.
The first and second testable implications are modelled
as the probability of being a partner or to move to another
practice:
yijt = ai + bxij(t−1) + gzj(t−1) + ijt (13)
where as in Eq. 12 i and j indicate the doctor and practice,
respectively; t = 2003, . . . , 2007, where yijt = 1 indicates
whether the doctor is a partner or has moved to another
practice. We argue that ai captures the unobserved
component of efficiency, the ability of doctor i. The time-
variant error term is denoted as ijt which also includes
practice effects dj.
To test the second implication of the theory, we model
mobility as a two stages Heckman model. The first stage
regression is essentially the same as Eq. 13 with yijt rep-
resenting the realised value of doctors’ propensity to stay
in the health care job market. The exclusion restriction
of the first stage regression is the number of years to
statutory retirement depending on the time of the sur-
vey. Statutory retirement does not vary by practice and
should not affect the probability of changing practice 9.
From each year’s probit model we calculate the Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR) as the ratio of the probability den-
sity function to the cumulative distribution function. We
then “stack” all IMRs and include the time-variant IMR
into the second stage random intercept multilevel model
of mobility. Conditional on staying in the market, doc-
tors might want to stay in the same practice or to move
practices which is formalised with the inclusion of the
time-varying IMR as additional covariate. In these speci-
fications we include 2003 as a pre-QOF year because we
want to test the effect of the introduction of a new perfor-
mance scheme on the contractual choice and mobility of
doctors.
Finally, we test the third implication of the theoretical
model by examining whether the price increase induced
by the QOF is associated with an increase of medical
effort (measured by the workload of a doctor or full-time
equivalence (FTE)), practice quality (measured by the pro-
portion of total QOF points) and a decrease in access of
new doctors in the market. The first two models can be
formalised as follows:
yijt = αi + βxij(t−1) + γ zj(t−1) + ijt (14)
where yijt indicates doctors’ effort measured by their FTE
and the proportion of total QOF points practice j achieves.
The other covariates are the same as those described
above, but t = 2004, . . . , 2007. The thirdmodel is formally
the same as the one in Equation 13 with yijt indicating
whether a new doctor entered the market.
Robustness checks
One potential threat to our empirical strategy is the iden-
tification of the effect of the QOF on doctors’ mobility
from a before and after comparison as the P4P scheme
applied to all practices. We can indirectly test the robust-
ness of the results of the 2005 price increase using a similar
price change that occurred in 2006. We use the exoge-
nous price shock determined by the increase in threshold
levels in 2006, constructed as a potential income loss
for each practice, and test its effect on doctors’ effort,
access of new doctors in the market and mobility. If the
before/after comparison was not biased by other policies
then we would expect this price decrease to generate simi-
lar results as before (but with opposite sign). We highlight
a caveat. As this price decrease only applied to some
indicators of cardiovascular diseases (CVD), there could
be effort diversion to similar tasks for which payments
remained unchanged. As an additional robustness check
we consider the full set of CVD indicators for which
effort diversion might have occurred. More formally, we
estimate:
yij = bxij + θSij + gzj + ijt (15)
where the unobserved component αi is differenced out
and yij indicates the change in FTE, access to the
market of new doctors and mobility. We estimate the
change in mobility separately for the top and bottom
performers, measured as practice performance in 2004.
xij includes the same characteristics as in Eq. (14), but
age. Sij is the exogenous price shock between 2005 and
2006.
Finally, models of partnership, mobility and access to
the healthcare job market could be estimated as non-
linear models because the outcome variables are binary.
The latent propensity to be a partner, to move to another
practice or to access the healthcare job market can be
modelled as:
y∗ijt = ai + bxij(t−1) + gzj(t−1) + ijt (16)
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where, as in Eq. 12, i and j indicate the doctor and practice,
respectively; t = 2003, . . . , 2007, and yijt = 1.(y∗ijt > 0).
Data and summary statistics
Data sources
Our analysis is based on two data sources: i) the Gen-
eral Practitioners’ Worklife Survey (GP WLS); and ii)
the General Medical Services (GMS) Statistics Databases
to which we link geodata and measures of practices’
quality. We use multiple data sources to combine
their relative strengths because the GP WLS records
doctors’ income, but as a small longitudinal sample
it does not contain a large sample of doctors who
move. The GMS database instead contains information
on all doctors in England, but does not record their
income.
We use the 2004 and 2005 longitudinal samples of about
2000 doctors from the GP WLS, a postal survey of GPs’
working lives undertaken by the National Primary Care
Research and Development Centre. The questionnaire
contains information on personal characteristics of the
GPs, their job satisfaction and some characteristics of the
practices.
The main data source are the GMS Statistics Databases
from 2003 to 2007. They are annual Censuses of GPs in
post at each September each year. They contain informa-
tion on practice codes, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) codes,
GPs age, gender and country of qualification; GP type (i.e.
salaried or partner), full-time equivalence (FTE) (includ-
ing hours if available). They also include information on
practice contract, whether it is a dispensing practice, its
list size by age-group and gender.
Any doctor who treats patients is required by the law
to register with the General Medical Council (GMC)
to obtain a licence to practice. Once registered, doctors
receive a GMC reference number that uniquely identi-
fies them. This number has been used to trace doctors in
the yearly Censuses so that our final dataset contains a
description of characteristics and movements of doctors
from 2003 to 2007.
Practice postcodes have been used to calculate dis-
tances and to link local areas characteristics such as the
Local Income Scheme Index (LISI) to this data. LISI is a
direct measure of practice list deprivation derived from
prescription data.
Finally, we link practice codes to the Health and Social
Care Information centre database containing numera-
tors, denominators and number of points that each
practice has obtained on all QOF indicators from 2004
onwards.
Summary statistics
Because income is recorded in the GPWLS in eight inter-
vals from less than £25,000 to more than £150,000, we
recode it as a continuous variable by assigning each doc-
tor the mid value of the income interval they report. The
average income in our GP WLS (2004-2005) sample is
about £73,311. On average, doctors report to work about
44 hours per week as GP10.
We also consider a number of practices’ and doctors’
characteristics from the GMS database (2003-2007). We
use FTE of doctors as measure of their effort (i.e. param-
eter ezi in the theoretical model). FTE indicates the work-
load of a doctor on a scale from 0 to 100 where 100
indicates the doctor is employed as full-time worker in
the practice and 50 signals that the worker is only half-
time. Table 1 reports that on average between 2003 and
2007 doctors work almost 91 percent of their working
time. But there is quite a high standard deviation indicat-
ing differences between doctors. The FTE in the GPWLS
(calculated from the self-reported weekly hours of work)
is about 97 percent.
Table 1 Description of the variables in the empirical models
2003-2007
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Outcome variables:
Principal 171,212 0.82 0.00 1.00
Mobility (old doctors) 141,930 0.06 0.00 1.00
New doctors 171,212 0.17 0.00 1.00
Exit 171,212 0.06 0.00 1.00
FTE 171,212 90.77 17.93 11.00 100.00
Proportion total QOF 138,303 96.97 5.68 10.00 100.00
points
Independent variables:
Age 171,212 45.18 9.74 23.00 85.00
Female 171,212 0.42 0.00 1.00
Practice years 171,212 28.92 6.26 0.00 32.99
Total population 171,204 8.77 4.51 0.00 37.61
(/1,000)
LISI 170,930 11.23 7.41 0.00 90.00
Proportion female 171,212 4.23 1.26 0.00 33.33
65-74
Proportion female 171,212 4.62 1.73 0.00 16.10
75+
Proportion male 171,212 3.91 1.17 0.00 33.33
65-74
Proportion male 171,212 2.89 1.19 0.00 100.00
75+
Distance to the 171,212 8.76 16.32 0.01 390.33
best practice
Price shock 35,043 -1.41 3.74 -36.86 0
Note: price shock refers to 2005/06
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Contractual status is available in the GMS data and
records whether the doctor is partner or salaried. On
average in our sample 82 percent of doctors work as
partners.
We use the GMC reference code in the GMS data to
identify new and old doctors. On average about seven
percent of doctors between 2003 and 2007 are newly qual-
ified, about six percent exit the healthcare job market or,
if they don’t exit the market, they move practice.
Our measure of quality (i.e. the parameter Q in the
theoretical model) is practice performance in the QOF
as measured by the proportion of total points achieved
by the practice. The revenue the practice earns varies
linearly between lower and upper thresholds of cov-
erage, called “achievement” A ∈ [ 0, 1]. It indicates
the proportion of eligible patients for which a spe-
cific measurement of quality has been achieved. No
money is received by the practice if achievement is
less than or equal to the lower threshold and the
maximum revenue is received if the practice is on or
above the upper threshold [see Gravelle et al. ([8]);
Doran et al. (2011) for further details]. Practices per-
formed quite well as the proportion of total points they
achieved in the QOF is almost 97 percent. The low
standard deviation indicates small differences between
practices.
We select a number of control variables that vary among
doctors and practices. On the doctor’s side, we consider
gender and age in years. Approximately 42 percent of doc-
tors are female and the average age of doctors is 45 years
old (with a standard deviation of 9 years). We show that
age indicates doctors’ experience which is an important
component of doctors’ efficiency parameter (i.e. parame-
ter γz).
On the practice’s side, we consider the number of
years the practice exists, the size of its population and
the proportion of its female and male population aged
65 or over. Practice years is calculated as difference
between current and opening date. On average, prac-
tices have been in business for about 29 years, but there
is a standard deviation of about 6 years. On average,
about four percent of the practice population is aged
65 or over. A practice could also have up to a third
of its population that is aged 65 or over. We also con-
sider a measure of deprivation based on prescribing in
general practice, the LISI (i.e. parameter bi in the the-
oretical model). More than 80 percent of prescription
by NHS GPs in England are exempt from charges. Most
of such exemptions are made on the basis of age and
specific diseases. However, 12.1 percent of items are
exempt because of low income. LISI includes recipients
(and their dependents) of family credit and income sup-
port and others who qualify because of low income.
It indicates the proportion of total cost in a practice
going to patients who are exempt for these reasons.
On average, eleven percent of a practice’s cost goes to
patients with low income, but there is quite a large vari-
ation between practices. Practices in deprived areas may
have to incur to 90 percent of their costs to poorer
patients.
We use the postcode to obtain the latitude and lon-
gitude of each practice. We then calculate the Vincenty
(1975) distance to the 10 closest practices. Vincenty’s
formula is used in geodesy to calculate the distance
between two points on the assumption that the figure
of the Earth is an oblate spheroid rather than spher-
ical. We then calculate the distance (in miles) of the
most distant practice amongst the closest 10 practices.
We select the distance to the best practice (measured by
its QOF points) that is the most further away amongst
the 10 selected practices. Under the assumption that
relocation costs increase with distance, this is an empir-
ical proxy for parameter t in the theoretical model.
We recognise, however, that attractiveness of a practice
is determined by other occupation characteristics (i.e.
wages) offered to the doctor that we cannot observe.
On average, the best practice is at about nine miles
distance, but there is a standard deviation of about 16
miles.
Finally, we select four indicators for the management of
cardiovascular diseases (CVD), the only ones for which
there was an increase in the threshold levels and/or a
decrease in the number of points from 2005 to 2006.
This change corresponds to a price decrease as practices
were paid less in 2006 if they performed the same as in
2005. These indicators measure whether practices suc-
cessfully manage CVD by keeping blood pressure and
cholesterol under the recommended levels. We aggre-
gate them into a CVD control indicator. For an aver-
age practice, these indicators were worth about £5,395
in 2006. We then define the exogenous price shock to
be the difference between what practices would receive
if they continued to provide the same quality in 2006
as they did in 2005 but with the new 2006 thresh-
olds and what they actually received in 2005. The size
of the negative price shock can be as high as 37%
and on average practices could lose up to 1% in 2006
if they performed in 2006 the same as they did in
2005.
Results and discussion
Before we discuss our results we explain how we mea-
sure efficiency. In Table 2 we report estimates of Eq. 12,
the pooled regression models of practice quality mea-
sured as the proportion of total QOF points. We indi-
rectly show that age is a proxy for doctor’s efficiency
with three separate models. First, in model I, estimated
on the GMS database, we find that in single-handed
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Table 2 Pooled linear models of determinants of practices’
quality (2004–2005)
GMS: GP worklife survey:
Model I Model II Model III
Age 0.84*** 0.24*** 0.33**
(0.23) (0.03) (0.14)
Age squared -0.01*** -0.003*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.002)
Female 0.70 0.09* 0.10
(0.52) (0.05) (0.20)
FTE 0.04 -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.03) (0.001) (0.005)
Income - - 0.000
(0.000)
Distance to the best 0.07 0.01** 0.01***
practice (0.06) (0.002) (0.003)
Total population 0.71*** 0.12*** 0.10***
(0.25) (0.01) (0.03)
LISI -0.15*** -0.10*** -0.09***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Proportion female 65-74 0.75** 0.66*** 0.39*
(0.37) (0.11) (0.23)
Proportion female 75+ 0.06 0.14** 0.27*
(0.24) (0.07) (0.15)
Proportion male 65-74 -0.20 -0.53*** -0.22
(0.38) (0.12) (0.28)
Proportion male 75+ -1.06** -0.33*** -0.52
(0.44) (0.12) (0.34)
Practice years -0.04 0.03*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant 74.19*** 92.78*** 90.35***
(6.07) (0.74) (3.21)
N. observations 1652 31,551 1971
N. practices 1652 8192 1659
Note: Model I on single practices, Models II-III on all practices
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10
practices an increase of doctor’s age is associated with
a better performance of the practice. But this associa-
tion is non-linear as it is characterised by an inverted-U
shape with a decline after the age of 42. The same non-
linear relation between age and quality of the practice
can be found in Model II using the full sample of prac-
tices. However, one limitation is that age could capture
the effect of omitted factors such as income. In Model
III, estimated on the GP WLS sample, we show that
even after controlling for doctors’ income, age statisti-
cally significantly affects practices’ quality. As doctors
gainmore experience they improve practices performance
up to the age of 41 after which their efficiency starts
declining.
We report results of the three testable implications
in four tables. The first and second testable implication
around doctor efficiency, partnership and mobility are
reported in Table 3. Results on the third testable implica-
tions are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
In Table 3 we report two models of the partnership
equation that show results of the first testable implica-
tion. Model I is a pooled linear regression and Model
II is a random intercept multilevel model where doc-
tors are nested in practices. Both models show that
more efficient doctors, where efficiency is proxied by
age, are more likely to become partners up to the age
of 35 after which the probability of becoming a part-
ner declines. Model II indicates that with a one year of
additional experience there is an increase in the prob-
ability of becoming a partner by five percentage points
when ability is accounted for, compared to seven percent-
age points when ability was unaccounted for in Model
I. Effort is a statistical significant factor in explain-
ing the probability to become a partner. We show that
the introduction of the QOF in 2004 decreased the
probability of becoming a partner by one percentage
point.
There is no evidence of sample selection in the mobil-
ity equation11. Mobility decreases with age as presum-
ably the costs of moving become higher. An addi-
tional year decreases the probability of moving by
six percentage points. A doctor working in a prac-
tice that performs better in terms of QOF points is
less likely to move. A ten percentage point increase
in the proportion of total QOF points decreases the
probability of moving practices by 0.4 percentage point.
But we observe a raise of mobility over time, in
2004 with the introduction of the QOF there is an
increase in the probability of moving by two percentage
points.
Models I-III in Table 4 report the estimates for the
third testable implication on themedical effort, the quality
of the practice and access of new doctors in the mar-
ket. We find evidence of a decrease in medical effort
(variable ezi in the model) associated with the increase
in the QOF price introduced in 2005. In Model II we
find however an increase in the proportion of total
QOF points achieved by practices. This result may be
explained by the possible effects that forms of intrinsic
motivation play in the market. Indeed theoretical contri-
butions (Bénabou and Tirole [1]) and industry praction-
ers12 have argued that doctors’ effort may not simply be
the result of financial decisions, but also the product of
social/reputational considerations. If reputation and pro-
social behaviour is important to doctors, the introduction
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Table 3 Linear probability models of partnership and mobility
(2003–2007)
Partnership: Mobility:
Model I Model II Model I
Age 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.06***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.0004*** 0.001***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00005)
Female -0.06*** -0.12*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Prop. total QOF points - - -0.0004***
(0.0001)
FTE 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001)
Distance to the best practice 0.0001 -0.00006 -0.00004
(0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00004)
Total population 0.009 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0002)
LISI -0.0003 -0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Proportion female 65-74 0.01*** 0.004** -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Proportion female 75+ 0.004 0.002** -0.003***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Proportion male 65-74 -0.001** -0.0004 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Proportion male 75+ -0.01* -0.0001 0.003*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Practice years 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Practice size -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
2004 -0.04*** -0.01*** 0.02***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
2005 -0.06*** -0.01*** 0.02***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
2006 -0.12*** -0.06*** 0.03***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
2007 -0.15 -0.07*** -
(0.003) (0.002)
Inverse Mills’ ratio - - -0.04
(0.05)
Constant -1.18*** -0.55*** 1.60***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
N. observations 141,529 141,529 141,529
N. practices 8507 8507 8507
Note: Model I is a pooled linear regression and Model II is a random intercept
multilevel model
Model I of Mobility is second stage of Heckman model
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10
Table 4 Linear models of doctors’ effort, practice quality and
access of new doctors (2004–2007)
Model I: Model II: Model III:
FTE Proportion of total Access of
QOF points new doctors
Age 0.36*** 0.17*** -0.01***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.0002)
Age squared -0.01*** -0.002*** -
(0.001) (0.0002)
Female -0.12*** 0.16*** -0.02***
(0.002) (0.05) (0.003)
Being a partner -0.07*** - -
(0.01)
Age* Being a 0.004*** - -
partner (0.0002)
Distance to the -0.02*** 0.001 -0.00004
best practice (0.002) (0.001) (0.0001)
Total population 0.50*** 0.01 -0.01***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.001)
LISI 0.04*** -0.11*** 0.001**
(0.01) (0.003) (0.0002)
Proportion female 0.45*** 0.52*** -0.001**
65-74 (0.14) (0.04) (0.003)
Proportion female -0.34*** 0.05* -0.001
75+ (0.08) (0.02) (0.002)
Proportion male 0.10 -0.48*** 0.004
65-74 (0.13) (0.04) (0.003)
Proportion male -0.05 -0.07** 0.001
75+ (0.09) (0.03) (0.004)
Practice years -0.03*** 0.04*** -0.0005*
(0.01) (0.004) (0.0003)
Practice size -0.58*** 0.23*** 0.01***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.001)
2005 -0.16** 3.40*** -0.04***
(0.08) (0.03) (0.002)
2006 4.39*** 3.54*** -0.06***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.002)
2007 4.09*** 3.69*** -0.07***
(0.94) (0.03) (0.002)
Constant 83.25*** 90.43*** 0.87***
(1.37) (0.42) (0.01)
N. observations 126,930 126,626 102,325
N. practices 8504 8472 5033
Note: Models I and II are linear random intercept multilevel models. Partner and
female in Model I
are on a 0-100 scale. Model III is a linear probability random intercept multilevel
model. ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10
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Table 5 First-differenced models with exogenous price shock
(2005–2006)
Model I: Model II:
Change in Change in access
FTE of new doctors
Price shock 0.10*** 0.001
(0.03) (0.0005)
Change in distance to the -0.05*** 0.001
best practice (0.01) (0.0001)
Change in total population 0.40*** -0.02***
(0.09) (0.002)
Change in LISI -0.01 -0.002
(0.03) (0.001)
Change in proportion female 1.10** 0.06***
65-74 (0.50) (0.02)
Change in proportion female -0.43 0.06***
75+ (0.34) (0.01)
Change in proportion male -0.03 0.01
65-74 (0.49) (0.01)
Change in proportion male -0.66 -0.16
75+ (0.63) (0.02)




N. observations 34,954 25,905
N. practices 8119 4756
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10
of a P4P scheme may induce doctors to reduce their
effort in those tasks that receive a financial incentive to
avoid being recognised as greedy. Practice management
instead may be less affected by reputational/pro-social
considerations, and may react positively to the intro-
duction of a P4P scheme. In model I there is also evi-
dence that more efficient doctors work more, but this
association declines as they get older. Effort provision
varies by contractual arrangement as more efficient part-
ners put more effort. The more distant the nearest best
QOF practice is, the less effort doctors put, indicat-
ing either less competition or lower demand for ser-
vices.
Finally, in Model III we report estimates of the lin-
ear probability model of access to the market of new
doctors. All covariates are contemporaneous because we
don’t observe the characteristics of doctors prior to their
Table 6 First-differenced models with exogenous price shock
(2005–2006)
Model I: bottom quintile Model II: top quintile
Change in mobility Change in mobility
Price shock -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.003)
Change of distance to -0.0001 0.0003
the best practice (0.0003) (0.0002)
Change in total -0.03*** 0.01
population (0.01) (0.01)
Change in LISI 0.004** -0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Change in proportion -0.04 -0.09**
female 65-74 (0.03) (0.04)
Change in proportion -0.005 -0.04
female 75+ (0.03) (0.04)
Change in proportion 0.01 0.02
male 65-74 (0.03) (0.04)
Change in proportion 0.01 0.16***
male 75+ (0.03) (0.05)
Change in practice -0.01* -0.00004
size (0.01) (0.004)




N. observations 5967 5384
N. practices 2282 1151
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10
entrance in the healthcare job market. In this specifica-
tion we compare 2005 with 2004 as we want to test the
effect of a price increase in the QOF on the likelihood that
doctors enter the market. We show there is no evidence
that an increase in the QOF price in 2005 has increased
doctors’ access to the healthcare job market. Actually,
compared to 2004 in 2005 the probability that a new
doctor enters the market decreases by four percentage
points.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 report the effect of the
price shock in 2005. We find results symmetric to the
previous ones with an increase of doctors effort and
access to the market of new doctors, although the latter
is not statistically significant. There is statistically signifi-
cant effect on mobility for either top or bottom practices
based on their performance in 2004. We replicate this
analysis using the exogenous price shock on all CVD
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indicators and find similar results which are available on
request.
In Table 7 in the Appendix we show that our results
on partnership, mobility and access to the healthcare job
market are unaffected by the linear specification because
the coefficients of the non-linear models are qualitatively
similar.
Conclusions
There is a lack of research on the sorting and reten-
tion effects that P4P may produce. In this paper we
focus on the only P4P scheme for General Practition-
ers in England, the Quality and Outcomes framework
(QOF).
We have developed a simple two-practice theo-
retical model where we account for doctors’ altru-
ism, different contractual arrangements and multidi-
mensional quality. The model predicts more efficient
doctors should be more likely to be offered a part-
nership. The QOF may induce less turn-over and
generate more mobility among more efficient doc-
tors.
We have then tested the empirical implications of
this model using a unique linkage between doctors
Census data from 2003 to 2007, practices’ character-
istics and quality as measured by the QOF in Eng-
land. After controlling for doctors’ unobserved hetero-
geneity in multilevel models where doctors are nested
in practices, we have found that the QOF is associ-
ated with a two percentage point increase in mobil-
ity. We have also found that the introduction of the
QOF is associated with a decrease in the probability
of becoming a partner by one percentage point, but
more efficient doctors are more likely to become part-
ners. More efficient doctors improve the quality of the
practice and if they are also partners they put more
effort.
Despite the relative richness of the data, our study has
some limitations. Firstly, as the QOF applied to all prac-
tices in England we identify its effect off time dummies.
However, the National Audit Office Report [11] does not
highlight any policy other than the QOF that was intro-
duced in England between 2004 and 2005. We have also
checked the robustness of our results using the 2006 neg-
ative price shock which is exogenous to the individual
doctor’s behaviour and we found similar results. Secondly,
we cannot measure wages at the same time as mobility.
We had to resort to an indirect method arguing that age
can proxy for experience, a component of efficiency. We
have shown this holds in single handed practices where
practice quality is doctor’s quality. However, this relies
on the assumption that the only factor that affects prac-
tices’ quality is doctors’ effort and not the effort of other
staff.
Endnotes
1 See for example Glazer [7]. In the rest of the paper will
use the terms devotion, vocation, motivation and altruism
interchangebly.
2 The assumption that the cost of effort is described by
a quadratic function is commonly adopted in the litera-
ture (see for example Brekke and Sørgard [3] and Zweifel
et al. [18]). The convexity of the cost function captures an
opportunity cost concept, i.e. the idea that an additional
unit of time/effort spent at work increases the value of
leisure.
3 The assumption that health care providers face a con-
vex function is standard. Convexity captures that idea
that practices face a capacity constraintthere are phys-
ical limitations in physical resources. See for example
Brekke et al. [2].
4 If the doctors had an outside option ensuring a mone-
tary reward greater than zero, then practices would have
to consider the satisfaction of a participation constraint
and, in case of a binding constraint, the fact that equilib-
rium profits would depend on the monetary remunera-
tion of the outside option. Qualitatively the results of the
model remain unchanged.
5The assumption that the partners of a practice equally
share profits is clearly a simplification. Nonetheless, given
the lack of information in the data available to us, it is an
innocent assumption.
6The opposite case where type v is located next to
practice 2 is completely symmetric to case (iii).
7 A very recent debate in the news seems to point out
thatmmay have been reduced in the last few years. http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24362902.
8Multilevel models are used because doctors are nested
in practices.
9We test the exclusion restriction assumption by
including the number of years to statutory retirement
directly in the mobility equation. We find that it does not
statistically significantly affect mobility.
10 These statistics are not reported in Table 1 as they are
not part of our main analysis.
11We do not report the results of the year-by-year first
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Appendix A: Additional model specifications
Table 7 Probit models of partnership, mobility and access of
new doctors)
Model I Model II Model III
Partnership: Mobility: Access of
new doctors:
Age 1.03*** -0.33*** -0.22***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared -0.01*** 0.003*** -
(0.0002) (0.00001)
Female -1.48*** 0.03 -0.07
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Prop. total QOF points - -0.01*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
FTE 0.02*** 0.003*** -
(0.001) (0.001)
Distance to the best practice 0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total population 0.13*** 0.02*** -
(0.01) (0.005)
LISI 0.004 0.002 0.01**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Proportion female 65-74 0.16*** -0.02 -0.13***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Proportion female 75+ 0.05* -0.04*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Proportion male 65-74 -0.08* 0.05** 0.09*
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Proportion male 75+ -0.06 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.01) (0.06)
Practice years 0.02*** -0.008*** -0.01**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Practice size -0.23*** -0.06*** 0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009)
2004 -1.96*** -0.01*** -
(0.18) (0.001)
2005 -2.02*** -0.01*** -0.88***
(0.18) (0.001) (0.03)
2006 -3.00*** -0.06*** -1.65***
(0.19) (0.002) (0.05)
2007 -3.35 -0.07*** -2.68***
(0.19) (0.002) (0.07)
Inverse Mills’ ratio - 5.25***
(0.62)
Constant -20.64*** 6.96*** 7.49***
(0.03) (0.25) (0.21)
N. observations 141,529 126,626 102,325
N. practices 8507 8507 5033
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.10
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